Abstract Apparently sophisticated behaviour during problem-solving is often the product of simple underlying mechanisms, such as associative learning or the use of procedural rules. These and other more parsimonious explanations need to be eliminated before higher-level cognitive processes such as causal reasoning or planning can be inferred. We presented three Bornean orangutans with 64 trial-unique configurations of a puzzle-tube to investigate whether they were able to consider multiple obstacles in two alternative paths, and subsequently choose the correct direction in which to move a reward in order to retrieve it. We were particularly interested in how subjects attempted to solve the task, namely which behavioural strategies they could have been using, as this is how we may begin to elucidate the cognitive mechanisms underpinning their choices. To explore this, we simulated performance outcomes across the 64 trials for various procedural rules and rule combinations that subjects may have been using based on the configuration of different obstacles. Two of the three subjects solved the task, suggesting that they were able to consider at least some of the obstacles in the puzzle-tube before executing action to retrieve the reward. This is impressive compared with the past performances of great apes on similar, arguably less complex tasks. Successful subjects may have been using a heuristic rule combination based on what they deemed to be the most relevant cue (the configuration of the puzzletube ends), which may be a cognitively economical strategy.
Introduction
Solving naturally occurring problems in the physical environment is a key challenge faced by animals on a daily basis, and has been proposed as a selection pressure to have driven the evolution of enhanced cognitive capacities in the primate lineage (Byrne 1997) . The psychological mechanisms and cognitive strategies involved in physical problem-solving are likely to vary between problems, species and even individuals (D'Mello and Franklin 2011) . Some problems might successfully be solved through simple mechanisms such as associative learning and reinforcement (the mental pairing of events that occur in close temporal and spatial proximity, Taylor et al. 2009 ), whereas more complex problems may require higher-level cognitive processes for efficient performance to be achieved (Kaller et al. 2011) . Solving particularly complex problems might necessitate the a priori identification of an appropriate behavioural sequence, or the evaluation of alternative actions in advance of execution. Such deliberative processes (as opposed to reactive processes; Sloman 1999) might be thought of as the internal simulation of interaction with the environment, or mentally 'trying out' potential actions in short-term working memory without actually executing them (D'Mello and Franklin 2011) . 1 Some behaviour observed in the wild is suggestive of deliberative cognitive processes. A classic example is the anecdotal observation of a single chimpanzee that used a 'tool set' consisting of different types of objects to achieve the goal of extracting honey from a bees' nest (Brewer and McGrew 1990) . The processing of plant material by both mountain gorillas (Gorilla beringei beringei: Byrne et al. 2001 ) and chimpanzees (Corp and Byrne 2002) has been demonstrated to involve hierarchical, multi-stage procedures, with the authors suggesting that sequence length may be an appropriate estimate of the complexity of underlying mental processes. Another challenge posed by the physical environment, particularly for large-bodied animals, is that of arboreal locomotion. Orangutans travelling through a forest canopy face several unique challenges, particularly during gap crossing. Successful travel requires them to make correct decisions regarding which supports to use and avoid, as an inappropriate choice resulting in a fall, even between canopy levels, may result in serious injury or even death, particularly for larger individuals (Thorpe et al. 2009 ). When choosing between alternate routes, they are faced with a vast amount of information to process from a multitude of potential perceptual cues, including the size of the gap to be crossed, the type and diameter of supports at either side of the gap, and how different supports are interconnected. The way that these factors interact may influence the size of a gap to be crossed. For example, effective gap sizes can change if the supports are highly compliant: these supports will bend when the orangutan applies its weight, often changing the size of the gaps between adjacent trees. Furthermore, Sumatran orangutans (Pongo abelii) utilise tree sway, whereby a support is oscillated to cross a gap in the canopy and progress forward (Thorpe et al. 2007 ). This often initially requires the support to be swung in the opposite direction (backwards) to the intended travel direction, in order to reach a sufficient magnitude of oscillation. Chevalier-Skolnikoff et al. (1982) suggest that such behaviour may be indicative of the internal simulation of behaviour prior to acting as opposed to physical experimentation, as during their focal period individuals always succeeded in making the transfers.
2 Bard (1995) also found that complex physical manipulations were exhibited significantly more frequently during arboreal locomotion than in foraging by young wild orangutans in a study based on Piagetian constructs. The author interpreted these findings as a use of cognitive abilities to achieve efficient and productive travel. It was also noted that planning was only observed in a locomotor context (out of seven defined contexts during which manipulatory behaviours could potentially occur). This was in the form of two juveniles selecting appropriate routes to reach their mothers who had used tree-sway to cross a gap, which the juveniles were unable to repeat (Bard 1995) . It has even been hypothesised that arboreal locomotion may have been a precipitator for self-recognition in the great apes (Povinelli and Cant 1995) . It is suggested that the unique combination of problems faced by a great ape ancestor during the Miocence, specifically an arboreal lifestyle to which it became 'committed' and a large body mass, selected for the evolution of self-conception enabling the planning and successful execution of complex locomotion through the rainforest canopy (Povinelli and Cant 1995) .
The ability of animals to identify an appropriate sequence of actions or consider alternative courses of action prior to execution has been investigated experimentally in several species, but the majority of these have either involved tool-use, which biases against nontool-using species, or used computerised tasks, which requires extensive training. Suddendorf and Whiten (2001) describe experiments conducted by Döhl in the late 1960s in which a chimpanzee was able to successfully complete a multi-stage task involving unlocking a series of transparent boxes with keys, leading to a final box containing a reward. Only by assessing the obligate sequence of stages in advance was the subject able to choose the correct initial key, with the researchers claiming that she was able to successfully evaluate the task up to five steps in advance. Lethmate (1982) adapted Döhl's experimental setting for an orangutan, so that it consisted of a choice-box and four boxes with unique bolting mechanisms that could only be opened with a corresponding key. One of the boxes contained a food reward, a further two contained keys (one of which could be used to open the final box containing the reward) and the fourth was empty. The choice-box contained two keys in separate compartments that each opened one of the two key-containing boxes. Choosing one of the tools from the choice-box simultaneously blocked access to the other tool. The contents of all boxes were visible to the orangutan, enabling it to choose the correct initial key that led, via an intermediate sub-goal, to the box containing the reward. Across 400 trials, the orangutan chose the correct initial key significantly more than expected by chance (in 312 trials), and the average duration of the 'phase of planning' before the initial action was 6.5 s (Lethmate 1982) . More recently, Dunbar et al. (2005) investigated whether allowing chimpanzees, Bornean 1 It should be noted that this does not necessarily imply any sort of phenomenal consciousness; that is, the subjective 'feel' of an experience (Carruthers 1998) . 2 Chevalier-Skolnikoff et al. (1982) actually use the term 'insightful solution' to describe tree sway behaviour, which is problematic for reasons described by Kacelnik (2009). orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) and children to have a prior view of a puzzle-box before attempting to open it meant that they retrieved a reward inside more quickly than when they were prevented from having a prior view, predicting that the prior view should permit them to consider the nature of the problem and its possible solutions mentally, prior to attempting it. Although there was seemingly an improvement in performance in the prior-view condition, detailed analyses of the data revealed that this was likely a result of experience and learning due to the nature of the experimental design, rather than 'working out' their actions in advance (Dunbar et al. 2005) . Further studies have investigated the ability to use tools in a means-means-end sequence (i.e. use a tool to retrieve another tool, which could be used to retrieve a food reward). Gorillas and orangutans were able to use a short tool to reach a longer tool, and only did so when the long tool was needed to reach the reward (Mulcahy and Call 2006) . Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata) learned how to sequentially use two tools within 50 trials after extensive training with both short and long tools (Hihara 2003) . A similar study with tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) found that subjects were only able to succeed at a pulling task involving two tools hooked together (tools were not in spatially distinctive locations due to the species' limited manual dexterity) after sufficient training (Santos et al. 2005) . In recent work on New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides) on the other hand, some individuals succeeded at tasks requiring sequential use of 3 tools (Wimpenny et al. 2009 ). Some authors suggest that certain individuals may even use abstract causal rules in novel contexts (Taylor et al. 2010) . Results from experiments with keas (Nestor notabilis) in which subjects' ability to open artificial fruit boxes requiring manipulations in multiple steps was tested suggested that in more complex tasks, permitting a preview period meant that birds were quicker to correct inappropriate actions (Miyata et al. 2011) . Evidence from studies on primates and birds using computer-based tasks is also indicative of the identification of appropriate behavioural sequences prior to executing actions during problem-solving. Biro and Matsuzawa (1999) demonstrated that a chimpanzee was able to establish the correct sequence in a numerical ordering task prior to making its first choice. In 2D maze navigation tasks, chimpanzees and capuchins (Cebus apella) solved more mazes without error than predicted by chance (Fragaszy et al. 2003) . Both species were capable of self-correcting mistakes and making appropriate detours (Fragaszy et al. 2003) , though a later study found that capuchins frequently made errors when the correct path meant moving away from the global goal (Fragaszy et al. 2009) . A similar study with pigeons (Columba livia) found evidence of planning of actions one step (and possibly two steps) in advance in computerised maze tasks (Miyata and Fujita 2008) . Finally, in studies of planning behaviour with two bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncatus), subjects had to learn to reuse a weight as a tool by dropping it into boxes that resulted in a reward being released, but one of the boxes retained the weight so that it could not be reused. Both individuals rapidly learned to visit the weight-retaining box last in order to obtain a maximum reward (Kuczaj et al. 2009 ).
It is difficult to tease apart alternative explanations for seemingly 'intelligent' behaviour, and the underlying mechanisms are often revealed to be relatively simple (e.g. Povinelli 2000) . Taylor et al. (2007) claimed that New Caledonian solved a sequential tool-use task by using analogical reasoning, but Wimpenny et al. (2009) conducted experiments that suggested simpler processes such as chaining (the interconnection of separate behavioural repertoires, sensu Epstein et al. 1984 ) may be sufficient to explain successful performance. Some recent studies have specifically aimed to differentiate between behavioural strategies used during physical problem-solving. Hunt et al. (2006) found that wild New Caledonian crows were probably using a two-stage heuristic strategy to solve a tool-length task, whereby they initially used default behaviour, but adapted it accordingly when it failed. Heuristic rules might be employed by animals when tasks are cognitively demanding in order to reduce the effort associated with solving them (Shah and Oppenheimer 2008) . Cheke et al. (2011) presented Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius) with a series of water-level tasks that manipulated the information that was available to facilitate learning, enabling them to infer the mechanisms by which learning occurred. The authors concluded that successful subjects seemed to rely on a combination of instrumental conditioning and causal cues (Cheke et al. 2011) .
We designed a puzzle-tube task based on the trap-tube paradigm (Visalberghi and Limongelli 1994) which was designed primarily to investigate causal reasoning, but is also a useful way of testing a subject's ability to consider the outcomes of different potential actions, with regard to the position of a trap and its impact on the path of a reward. However, unlike the original trap-tube apparatus in which the only obstacle was a single trap at one side, we incorporated multiple obstacles at both sides to investigate how orangutans might go about solving a problem involving the consideration of multiple steps and information from several perceptual cues. We also attempted to address methodological and procedural issues found to influence performance on previous trap-tube tasks, including the requirement to use tools (Seed et al. 2006; Tebbich et al. 2007) , tools being prepositioned in the apparatus (Girndt et al. 2008) , having to push the reward away from oneself (Mulcahy and Call 2006) and a predisposition to avoid displacing rewards over traps (Seed et al. 2006 (Seed et al. , 2009 Tebbich et al. 2007; Martin-Ordas and Call 2009) . These studies showed that subjects' performances may be strongly influenced by procedural features of the experimental design. Therefore, our task uniquely combined the following features:
1. It did not require tool-use 2. It did not require the reward to be pushed away from the subjects 3. It did not always require trap avoidance for the correct response 4. It was presented as trial-unique configurations, so that the configuration of obstacles had to be evaluated anew on each trial 5. The number of trials was deliberately limited to minimise the possibility of the task being solved using associative learning
In the present study, we investigated whether Bornean orangutans were able to consider the impact of multiple obstacles on the path of a reward and therefore identify a priori the correct direction in which to move the reward before executing actions to obtain it. In addition to establishing whether subjects were able to solve the task (i.e. choose the correct direction), we examined post hoc how they might have been attempting to do so. We predicted that orangutans should perform well in such a task, given that they successfully navigate gaps in the canopy without reaching arboreal 'dead-ends', suggesting that they decide on and follow routes prior to beginning their travel (Thorpe, personal observation) . As the most distantly related of our great ape relatives, their study is also interesting from a phylogenetic perspective with regard to tracing the emergence of the cognitive capacities related to complex physical problem-solving.
Materials and methods

Subjects and housing
Three subjects, all mother-reared and housed at Apenheul Primate Park (Netherlands) participated in the task reported here (see Table 1 ).
Eight adult orangutans (six females and two males) were initially identified for participation in the study; however, five subjects were dropped following the initial phases (see 'familiarisation phase' section below for details). Both indoor and outdoor enclosures were equipped with climbing elements including tree trunks, fibreglass poles, ropes and netting, and enrichment objects such as puzzle feeders were available.
Apparatus
The apparatus was attached to the outside of the enclosure and consisted of an opaque Perspex puzzle-tube (75 cm 9 12 cm 9 10 cm) with the following components that could be manipulated by the experimenter (see Fig. 1 ):
1. Gap size of traps: large (4.5 cm); medium (3 cm); small (2 cm) 2. Trap direction: forwards (opening towards subject); backwards (opening towards experimenter) 3. Ends configuration: each end could be open or closed
The apparatus permitted a total of four gaps in the base of the tube (two at each side of the reward's central starting position). The size of the reward (a walnut) meant that it fell through large gaps but could be displaced over small and medium gaps. If the trap beneath a large gap was facing forwards, then the reward could be retrieved by the subject (for an example, see Fig. 2c and the online resource ESM_1.mpg; video captions can be found in the online resource ESM_5.pdf). If on the other hand the trap was facing backwards, then it was lost by the subject (as shown in Fig. 2d , e and the online resource ESM_2.mpg) and collected by the experimenter and disposed of. The direction in which the traps beneath small and medium gaps faced was irrelevant as the reward never fell into them, but they were included so that the location of a single trap type could not be used as an arbitrary cue. At one side of the puzzle-tube, there was a small gap followed by a medium (2) and small (3) gaps with traps beneath them that could face either forwards (towards subject) or backwards (towards experimenter), and end pieces (4). The gap sizes were always configured in the order shown in the plan view (b), though the entire configuration could be rotated 180°. The reward (R) is shown in its central starting position for each trial gap and at the other side, a medium gap followed by a large gap (see Figs. 1b, 2) . The basis for this configuration of gaps was that if subjects only considered the obstacles closest to the reward, i.e. the first gap that must be navigated, then we would expect them to move the reward towards the smaller of the two gaps. Thus, the initial small gap on one side of the tube potentially acted as a perceptual 'lure', because compared with the initial medium-sized gap on the other side, it should have seemed that the reward was less likely to fall through. However, as a large gap resulted in the reward being retrieved in some trials but lost in others, trap direction and the configuration of the end pieces also had to be considered. If an end of the tube was open and the two gaps on the same side were small enough for the reward to pass over, then the reward could be retrieved from the end (see Fig. 2a and the online resource ESM_3.mpg). Therefore, because there were multiple obstacles in each direction, subjects needed to look ahead and consider the effect of each obstacle on the reward in order. Only by evaluating the multiple obstacles at both sides of the puzzle-tube (the configuration of gaps, the direction in which the trap beneath the large gap was facing, and whether the ends were open or closed) before selecting the initial direction in which to move the reward could subjects achieve perfect performance. However, by attending to some cues but not others performance could still differ from what would be expected by chance (i.e. a 50% success rate; see 'Results' section for detailed explanation).
General procedure
Subjects were tested in separation rooms (10-15 m 2 ) where they were held on a regular basis for feeding and cleaning purposes. During the testing phase, they were tested in isolation except for one adult female (Sandy) who was accompanied by two dependent juveniles. Subjects were not food deprived before the trials, water was available ad libitum and they could choose to stop participating at any time. The reward in each trial was a walnut, and subjects remained motivated to obtain them throughout the study. Subjects manipulated the reward through a series of finger holes (see Fig. 1a ) and could retrieve the reward either via an open end of the tube or a forward-facing trap beneath a large gap.
Familiarisation phase
All eight potential subjects were presented with the puzzletube in its simplest configuration, with a continuous solid base (no gaps or traps) and both ends open. This tested whether the ability to access the reward by rolling it out of either end of the tube was within their sensorimotor repertoire and also familiarised them with the apparatus to minimise the risk of neophobic responses during the testing phase. Four subjects were dropped from the study at this stage due to a lack of interest, motor problems or becoming too nervous or frustrated in the separation areas. Following baseline testing the remaining four subjects then participated in a simpler task (the gap-size task) than the one reported here, consisting of 32 trial-unique configurations that incorporated only a single gap at each side of the tube, which could be small or large (basic methods and data for this task are provided in the online resource ESM_6.pdf). Subsequently, a further subject was dropped from the study as she repeatedly attempted to squeeze the reward through the central finger hole rather than moving it in either direction from its central starting position. The remaining subjects that participated in the testing phase were Amos, Sandy and Silvia (see Table 1 ). 
Testing phase
Based on the three puzzle-tube variables (gap size, trap direction and ends configuration), we generated 64 trialunique configurations (32 oriented left and right), three schematic examples of which are shown in Fig. 2 .
Limiting the total number of trials minimised the opportunity for learning across the task and reduced the chance of the task being solved through associative learning and reinforcement. These 64 trials were pseudorandomised into 6 blocks of either 11 (blocks 1-4) or 10 (blocks 5 and 6) trials. Order of block presentation was randomised for each subject. Subjects received one block per day, with session referring to the sequential order in which the blocks were presented.
In each trial, the test subject was presented with the empty apparatus for a preview period of up to 20 s, though this was cut short if the subject lost interest in the apparatus or became frustrated. The reward was then placed in the centre of the puzzle-tube for the subject to manipulate. In each trial, the reward could be retrieved if it was moved towards one side but not the other (the 'correct' side varied between trials). Figure 2 shows some schematic examples of the outcomes of moving the reward in the 'correct' (Fig. 2a-c) and 'incorrect' (Fig. 2d-f ) directions.
Data scoring and analysis
All trials were videotaped. For each trial, we scored whether the initial choice of direction (defined as the direction in which the subject first moved the reward, even if this was subsequently switched) was correct or incorrect, and whether it was to the left or right. Subjects were allowed to correct their mistakes if they chose the incorrect initial direction, so in some 'incorrect' trials they eventually went on to retrieve the reward. If a mistake was corrected prior to the reward reaching an impeding obstacle (closed end or large backwards-facing gap), this was scored as 'self-corrected'. The dependent measure was the percentage of correct responses defined as choosing the correct initial direction in a trial. Two-tailed binomial tests were used to assess whether individual subjects' initial choice of direction across the 64 trials differed from what would be expected by chance (50% correct) and also whether they showed any directional preferences. The alpha value for the significance level was always 0.05. Data were analysed using PASW Statistics 18 (IBM SPSS Inc. 2009) and R 2.11.1 (LME4 package, R Development Core Team 2010).
Rule simulations
When attempting to solve the task, subjects could have used the configuration of one or more of the obstacles as a cue for choosing the direction in which to move the reward. To explore whether this might have been the case, we generated simulated performance outcomes (% correct responses) semi-manually using a computer for the 64 trials based on five different procedural rules and six rule combinations (see Fig. 4 caption for details of rules) and plotted these together with subjects' performances (Fig. 4) . For example, if subjects chose the initial direction in which to move the reward based on the procedural rule 'always move the reward away from the large gap' ('avoid L gap' in Fig. 4) , we could produce a simulated '% correct responses' outcome by examining each of the 64 trials in turn and generating an initial choice of direction based on following that rule, and determining whether this would have been correct or incorrect for that particular trial. For rule combinations, rules were used in sequence on each trial until an unambiguous outcome was achieved (i.e. the reward was either gained or lost). For example, for the rule combination 'O end/L gap' (see Fig. 4 ), in all trials where there was only one open end, the reward was moved towards it (first rule: 'O end'). However, in trials where both ends were configured the same, the rule 'O end' generated an ambiguous outcome, so the second rule ('L gap') was used; that is, the reward was moved towards the large gap, resulting in the reward either being gained or lost. For rules and rule combinations that involved direction being chosen at random (decided by random numbers generated in Excel), the simulation was repeated 10 times to give a range of possible outcomes (n = 640).
GLMMs
We used generalised linear mixed modelling (GLMM) (Crawley 2007; Melis et al. 2011) to assess the effects of testing session (1-6) and the puzzle-tube variables (ends configuration, gap size and trap direction) on whether the initial choice of direction was correct or incorrect. Only one gap size was used in the models as the configuration of gaps was always as shown in Fig. 1b (or rotated through 180°) .
Results
Initial choice of direction
Amos' and Sandy's performances differed significantly from chance-level (50% correct) across the 64 trials (binomial test: 51 out of 64 trials correct; P \ 0.0001 and 43 out of 64 trials correct; P = 0.008 respectively, see Fig. 4 ). Silvia chose the correct initial direction in 25 out of 64 trials, which was below chance level but not significantly so (binomial test: P = 0.103). Figure 3 shows subjects' performances across consecutive testing sessions.
Amos' performance differed significantly from chance level in his first testing session (binomial test: 10 out of 11 trials correct; P = 0.012; see Fig. 3 ). Amos and Sandy both chose the correct initial direction in the first trial in five out of the six testing sessions, including the first trial of their first sessions. Amos' performance ranged from 70 to 91% of trials correct within a session, and Sandy's from 50 to 91%. Sandy's performance showed a net overall improvement in performance across sessions (see Fig. 3) ; this was tested quantitatively in the GLMMs described later. Silvia's best within-session performance was 50% of trials correct in session 4, with her poorest performance occurring in session 2 (30% of trials correct, see Fig. 3 ).
Directional preferences
Neither Amos nor Sandy showed a directional preference across the 64 trials (binomial test: P = 0.53 and P = 0.10, respectively). Silvia on the other hand showed a significant overall preference to move the reward to the right (64.1% of trials; binomial test: P = 0.03).
Self-correction
Amos did not self-correct in any trials. Sandy self-corrected her initial choice of direction in 2 out of 21 (9.5%) and Silvia in 8 out of 39 (20.5%) incorrect trials. All selfcorrections occurred when the impeding obstacle was a closed end of the puzzle-tube; never when it was a large backwards-facing gap. Subjects usually self-corrected following tactile exploration of the closed end.
Rule simulations
Subjects' individual performances and the simulated outcomes based on various rules and rule combinations are shown in Fig. 4 .
As Amos' and Sandy's performances both differed significantly from chance-level (see Fig. 4 ), this suggests that they were not choosing the direction in which to move the reward randomly ('Random'), or based solely on a directional bias ('Left', 'Right'). Neither were simply avoiding the large gap or succumbing to the potential 'perceptual lure' of the small gap ('avoid L gap'), nor always moving towards the large gap ('L gap'), as all of these simulations generated performance outcomes of around 50% correct (see Fig. 4 ). However, simulating directional choices for Fig. 3 Percentage of correct responses by each subject across the six consecutive testing sessions. There was no significant improvement in subjects' performances, though Sandy's performance did show a net improvement. Horizontal dotted line indicates chance-level performance (50% correct) Fig. 4 Percentage of correct responses for the three subjects (n = 64) and simulated performance outcomes based on five procedural rules and six rule combinations: Random move reward in random direction, Left move reward left, Right move reward right, L gap move reward towards large gap, avoid L gap move reward away from large gap (n = 64 for each). O end move reward towards open end of tube; C end move reward towards closed end of tube. For rule combinations (e.g. O end/random), rules were used in sequence on each trial until an unambiguous outcome was achieved (i.e. the reward was either gained or lost). Simulations involving direction being chosen at random were repeated 10 times to give a range of possible outcomes (n = 640). For boxplots, the line across the box is the median and the whiskers indicate the range of outcomes for ten repeated simulations. Dotted line indicates chance-level performance (50% correct); dashed box shows that Amos' and Sandy's performances fell within the range of simulated outcomes for the O end/random rule combination, as did the other two rule combinations involving the configuration of the open end Anim Cogn (2012) 15:121-133 127 the 64 trials using the rule combination 'move reward towards open end of the tube; if not applicable choose direction at random' ('O end/random' in Fig. 4 ) generated a range of outcomes significantly different to 50% correct (64.1-81.3%, Fig. 4 ). Both Amos' (79.7% correct) and Sandy's (67.2% correct) performance fell within this range (see dashed box in Fig. 4) . Two further rule combinations based on primarily moving the reward towards the open end and secondarily moving the reward either towards or away from the large gap ('O end/L gap' and 'O end/avoid L gap' in Fig. 4 ) also resulted in a simulated performance outcome of 75% correct (Fig. 4) . Silvia's performance did not correspond to or fall within the range of any of the simulated performance outcomes (see Fig. 4 ).
GLMMs
We fitted a model with initial choice of direction as a binary response, subject as a random factor, session as a covariate with fixed effect, and ends configuration (same, different), gap size 1 (large, small; which determines other gap sizes), and the direction each trap was facing (forwards, backwards) as fixed factors. This analysis confirmed that subjects were more likely to choose the correct initial directions when the ends were configured the same, i.e. both open or both closed, as opposed to one open and one closed, as ends configuration was the only factor that influenced whether the initial choice of direction was correct or incorrect (see Table 2 ). We compared this first full model with a model that did not include ends configuration as a fixed factor. The fit of the second more parsimonious model resulted in a significant reduction of fit (likelihood ratio test comparing the two models: v 2 = 9.871; P = 0.002), indicating that ends configuration explains a significant amount of variance. Notably, session had no influence on whether the initial choice of direction was correct or incorrect (see Table 2 ), i.e. there was no significant variation in performance between testing sessions. Additional analyses showed no interaction effects among the factors in the model.
Ends configuration
In the subset of trials in which the puzzle-tube ends were configured, one open and one closed (n = 32), Amos and Sandy chose the correct initial direction in 90.6 and 87.5% of trials, respectively. In the other trials, where the ends of the tube were configured the same Amos' performance was the same whether the ends were either both open or both closed (68.8%; n = 32; P = 0.052). Sandy's performance in this subset of trials was close to chance-level (46.9%, n = 32; P = 0.860), though she performed better when the ends were both closed (56.3% correct; n = 16) than when they were both open (31.3% correct; n = 16). This consideration of different subsets of trials supports the results of the GLMM analysis; that the configuration of the ends does indeed influence performance. Silvia's performance was below chance-level in all subsets of trials.
Discussion
We devised a novel puzzle-tube task that aimed to investigate orangutans' ability to consider the impact of multiple obstacles in two alternative paths on a reward, prior to choosing a direction in which to move it. When designing the task, we aimed to minimise the methodological and procedural concerns of previous studies based on the trap-tube paradigm. We also developed a novel analytical method of rule-simulation for exploring how subjects may have been attempting to solve the task with regard to what potential procedural rules or rule combinations might have been used.
Two of the three subjects (Amos and Sandy) solved the task (that is, performed significantly above chance) across the 64 trial-unique configurations. Importantly, Amos performed significantly above chance level in his first session, and both successful subjects responded correctly in their initial trial in 5 out of 6 sessions. These results are impressive, given that in previous studies only 2 out of 5 and 2 out of 6 orangutans solved arguably simpler tasks in which they had to learn to avoid a single trap, and required a greater number of trials to do so (Martin-Ordas et al. 2008; Mulcahy and Call 2006) . Furthermore, in both of those studies, the only variation between trials was the side on which the trap appeared. Therefore, subjects could have solved the tasks based on the single procedural rule 'move the reward away from the trap'. In a study by Seed et al. (2009) using a two-trap box that did not require tool-use, all eight chimpanzee subjects learnt to avoid a trap in 40-100 trials. However, only one subject was able to successfully transfer between two tasks that required opposite responses based on the configuration of an arbitrary cue; the other seven continued to use a single procedural rule ('push towards the shelf piece') that applied to the previous task (Seed et al. 2009 ). Fragaszy et al. (2009) suggested that implementing a forced delay may support the selection of behaviours other than the prepotent one, and there is some evidence to suggest that orangutans may outperform other great ape species in tasks requiring inhibitory control (Vlamings et al. 2010) . Furthermore, keas were quicker to correct mistakes when opening boxes with multiple locks following a short (10-30 s) preview period (Miyata et al. 2011) . It is therefore possible that the short preview period in our experiment permitted subjects to consider the multiple obstacles at each side of the puzzle-tube prior to acting, though there were no obvious behavioural differences between subjects during this time (Tecwyn, personal observation). Dunbar et al. (2005) did not identify an effect of prior view on chimpanzees' or orangutans' speed of retrieving a reward from a puzzle-box. However, in the past, orangutans have frequently been dismissed as ''sluggish, slothful and uninteresting'' (Russon 2010) , which suggests that latency may not have been an appropriate measure of performance due to inter-species behavioural differences. To our knowledge, this is also the first time that orangutans have been tested on a trap-tube-like task that does not require tool-use, so it is possible that the additional cognitive load of having to use a tool may have been masking the species' actual understanding of such tasks in previous experiments, as was found to be the case for chimpanzees (Seed et al. 2009 ).
What possible strategies could an animal potentially use when attempting to solve a novel problem and how do these relate to our task? By deliberately limiting the total number of trials reduced the potential for associative learning and reinforcement across trials, and the fact that the GLMMs did not reveal a significant effect of testing session on performance (i.e. subjects did not improve significantly at the task with additional trials, see Table 2 and Fig. 3) suggests that associative learning does not explain the performance of the successful subjects. Amos in particular provides a strong case against learning across trials, as he performed significantly above chance-level in his first testing session. Although it is possible that subjects could have learned relevant associations prior to the study, to our knowledge they had not been presented with any similar apparatus. A puzzlefeeder that had been used by Sandy and Silvia in the past involved using a stick to navigate a reward through a vertical maze, causing it to drop through a series holes and out of the bottom. Amos had never used the puzzle-feeder.
A lack of evidence for learning does not, however, eliminate the possibility that subjects were using a procedural rule from the initial trial (Fedor et al. 2008) . Such a rule could be based on an arbitrary or relevant cue, and could be appropriate or inappropriate. In contrast to previous similar studies, in our task every trial configuration was unique, and no single cue (e.g. a small gap) individually identified the correct directional response, making it impossible to perform perfectly by using a single procedural rule in relation to a single cue. However, our rule simulations (Fig. 4 ) demonstrated that on our task at least it was possible to perform significantly better than chance (though not perfectly) by using one of the three following 2-rule combinations, all of which involved an initial examination of the configuration of the puzzle-tube ends: 'move reward towards open end of the tube; if not applicable (a) choose direction at random; (b) move towards the large gap; or (c) move away from the large gap'; (see dashed box in Fig. 4) . It is feasible that Amos and Sandy were using rule combination (a) as both of their performances fell within the range of simulated outcomes for the 64 trials based on it (see Fig. 4 ). The results of the GLMM analyses quantitatively supported the notion that successful subjects were able to use ends-configuration as a relevant cue for choosing the direction in which to move the reward when one was open and one closed, as they performed better in this subset of trials compared to when both ends of the tube were configured the same (both open or both closed). Furthermore, self-corrections only occurred when the impeding obstacle was a closed end (not a large backwards-facing gap), which suggests that subjects were able to use this as a cue, even if they did not do so prior to choosing their initial direction. Self-correcting may be indicative of a 'planful' (Willats 1989) or forward search strategy, whereby subjects only look ahead to the obstacles in the path of the reward once it has already been moved either left or right (Fragaszy et al. 2003; Pan et al. 2011) .
A further possibly more cognitively demanding strategy would be to consider different potential actions and their outcomes for each trial via deliberative processes in working memory, prior to choosing which direction to move the reward in. Amos performed above chance-level, though not significantly so (68.8% correct; n = 32; P = 0.052) in the subset of trials where one open end could not be used as a cue for choosing direction (as both ends were configured the same), which suggests that he may also have been able to use relevant information regarding gap size and trapdirection to some extent. This suggests that he may have been considering obstacles other than the ends of the tube. Furthermore, he was equally able to both avoid the large gap and to use it to access the reward, as he performed equally well in trials requiring either one of these outcomes (11 out of 16 correct for both; see Fig. 5 ). It therefore seems likely that Amos was either using deliberative processes to some extent, or was able to use a number of procedural rules flexibly, depending on the configuration of cues in a given trial. Alternatively, subjects could have used deliberative processes when initially faced with the task, for example in the first or first few trials, and subsequently constructed and used rules based on this limited experience. Figure 5 shows that, in fact, subjects could have achieved perfect performance by using three procedural rules (R1-R3) based on the three possible configurations of the ends of the tube and considering the position of the large gap (also see Fig. 2 for schematic examples of these). The numbers in shaded circles indicate the number of trials in which individual subjects chose the correct initial direction in trials with that configuration (see Fig. 5 ).
In Fig. 2 , subjects could have chosen the correct initial direction in each of the three example configurations shown by using one of three rules shown in Fig. 5 : in (a) by using rule R1; in (b) by using rule R2; and in (c) by using rule R3. Using rule R1 would only require the subject to examine the configuration of the puzzle-tube ends; therefore, these trials (n = 32) could be solved by following the simple procedural rule 'move reward towards open end of the tube' (as in Fig. 2a) . Using the other two rules (R2 and R3 in Fig. 5 ) would require both ends-configuration and the position of the large gap to be considered (as in Fig. 2b, c) . The correct initial direction could also have been chosen in the remaining 61 configurations using the decision tree shown in Fig. 5 . But why would subjects use procedural rules (if indeed this is what they were doing) rather than considering each trial individually, and is one approach more cognitively demanding than the other? Shah and Oppenheimer (2008) suggest that the use of heuristic rules in problem-solving, for example examining fewer cues, may reduce cognitive effort (in humans at least) by decreasing the amount of information to be held in working memory at a given time. Such rapid, simple strategies may be advantageous in the natural environment and do not rule out the capacity for more sophisticated strategies (Seed and Byrne 2010) . In our task, subjects could have opted to focus on the cue they deemed to be most important (seemingly the puzzle-tube ends), and where there was a tie on this cue (if both ends were configured the same) they may have examined what they deemed to be the second most important cue (e.g. gap size, see Fig. 5 ). Although this may seem contradictory as it still requires multiple cues to be examined, it nonetheless reduces the cognitive demands of the decision-maker as they are only ever considering a single cue at a time (Shah and Oppenheimer 2008) . Mitchell et al. (2009) discuss the use of simulation-versus rule-based approaches in the development of passing false-belief tests in children and suggest that in this context at least, simulation is the effortful default, with cognitively economical rules being derived from experience over time.
There was substantial between-subject variation in performance on this task, which makes it difficult to generalise about the cognitive mechanisms involved. Even if two individuals' performances were the same, it is possible that one could have used heuristic rules to solve the task, whereas the other used more abstract reasoning (Chittka and Jensen 2011) . However, differences in performance can prove revealing with regard to different strategies used. In a recent study investigating understanding of gravity and solidity in great apes, Cacchione and Call (2010) found that different individuals used different strategies when searching for a reward, and not all individuals were able to change strategy flexibly. The use of different strategies may help explain the differences in performance observed here, with Amos being the most flexible. Sandy may have acquired a correct rule over time, as her performance showed a general but non-significant trend of improvement across sessions (see Fig. 3 ). Silvia may have been using an incorrect rule (such as always moving the reward towards the closed end of the tube, which she did in 20 out of 32 trials where the ends were configured one open and one closed, see Fig. 5 ) which would have led to a systematic error within the subset of trials with the ends configured one open one closed, though her performance did not appear to correspond with any of the simulated performance outcomes (see Fig. 4 ). She did, however, self-correct in more trials than the other two subjects (20.5% of her incorrect trials), which may be indicative of a more 'planful' than 'planned' strategy, as was found to be the case for capuchin monkeys navigating 2D mazes (Pan et al. 2011) . As a wild- Fig. 5 Subjects could have chosen the correct initial direction in 100% of trials using the decision tree shown here, which is based on the configuration of the puzzle-tube ends and the location of the large gap in a given trial. When the ends of the tube were configured one open and one closed (n = 32) a single procedural rule (R1) could be used to identify the correct initial direction. When the ends of the tube were configured both open (n = 16) or both closed (n = 16), subjects also needed to consider the position of the large gap and use a decision rule based on that (R2 or R3). Numbers in shaded circles show the number of trials in which each subject chose the correct initial direction caught orangutan, it is likely that Silvia's opportunities to gain learning experience in her early years were rather different to the other two subjects (born in captivity), which may have affected her problem-solving behaviour (Lethmate 1979) . During a 9-year study Galdikas (1982) found that ex-captive orangutans released into the wild exhibited tool-using behaviour in a much wider variety of contexts, compared with wild orangutans. Galdikas attributes this to differential learning experiences during critical learning periods before maturity (Galdikas 1982) . Another point worthy of note regarding Silvia is that she was the most difficult subject to encourage to come to the apparatus (Tecwyn, personal observation), which may be indicative of her lower levels of motivation and attentiveness compared with the other subjects. It is interesting to note that the 9-year-old subject performed best, as the four orangutans that solved trap-tube analogous tasks in other studies were all aged between 11 and 18, from a tested range of 6-33 years (Martin-Ordas et al. 2008; Mulcahy and Call 2006) . This study increases the upper age tested to 44 years. It is possible that success in tasks of this nature may be related to age class, as younger orangutans are generally more exploratory of their habitat and its affordances, which is reflected in their larger locomotor repertoire Crompton 2005, 2006) , but a far larger data set would be required to substantiate this.
In summary, our novel task improved on the methodological and procedural limitations of previous similar tasks and minimised the potential for associative learning across trials by presenting a deliberately limited number of trialunique configurations. The design of our task did not permit unequivocal conclusions regarding the use of higherlevel, deliberative processes to be drawn; rather, our use of rule-simulations in the analyses demonstrated that successful subjects could have solved the task by using a combination of two procedural rules. GLMMs quantitatively supported the notion that the configuration of the puzzle-tube ends was used as a cue for choosing direction. This is nevertheless impressive, as performance did not improve significantly across sessions and Amos performed above chance-level in his initial session, suggesting that if these subjects were using a rule-based approach they must have already possessed some appropriate previously acquired causal knowledge (e.g. the inability of a reward to pass through barriers and possibly the size of a reward relative to a gap). Furthermore, the use of rules may in fact be a cognitively economical strategy compared with the use of deliberative processes for each trial (Shah and Oppenheimer 2008) . Silvia may have been using an incorrect rule (e.g. move the reward towards the closed end), resulting in a systematic error that contributed to her poor performance, though previous experience, motivation and attention may have also played a key role.
Future studies should develop new paradigms to investigate the how tasks that require consideration of multiple steps prior to implementing actions are solved, with regard to cognitive strategies that subjects use. The focus should be on contexts in which animals are more likely to go beyond using simple strategies, and tasks should be constructed in such a way that success via the use of procedural rules is not possible. If the number of steps to be considered between initiation of actions and achieving the desired outcome could be systematically increased [which might be expected to increase cognitive demand (Wimpenny et al. 2009 )], a 'planning threshold' could theoretically be reached. It would be particularly interesting to compare the performance of a number of primate species on such tasks to generate a phylogenetic reconstruction of this cognitive ability and to begin to understand the socioecological challenges that may have driven its evolution. It is also imperative that future studies continue to attempt to tease apart alternative underlying cognitive mechanisms, with increased emphasis on detailed analyses of behaviour, as it seems that such studies with primates are now falling behind those conducted with birds (see e.g. Cheke et al. 2011; Miyata et al. 2011; Wimpenny et al. 2009 ).
